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What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance 
 
1. Introduction 
If heterogeneous CEO characteristics matter for firm performance, which 
characteristics define a good CEO? The corporate governance literature has established 
that the personal characteristics of CEOs hold explanatory power in explaining firm 
performance differentials (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; 
Frank and Goyal, 2007; Malmendier et al., 2011; Kaplan et al., 2012; Fee et al., 2013; 
Graham et al., 2013). Our paper contributes to literature by disentangling the dynamic 
relationships between CEO education and the incentives for risk-taking that are implicit in 
the structure of executive compensation contracts, in order to determine the effects on firm 
performance outcomes. We investigate possible channels through which CEO education 
and the choice of business policies interact and influence performance outcomes. Our 
findings shed light on an important yet unresolved issue. Graham et al. (2012) and 
Benmelech and Frydman (2015) cite a paucity of substantive evidence on the effects of 
unobservable personal characteristics like the innate ability of CEOs that conditions 
educational attainment, and which shapes CEO fixed-effects and firm performance.  
This paper offers a rigorous treatment on whether and how CEO educational attainment 
affects firm performance. Educational attainment influences career outcomes in terms of 
pay and career trajectory. Literature shows that education background conditions firm 
investments and general decision-making (Laderman, 1994; Donkers et al., 2001; Frank 
and Goyal, 2007). Educational attainment contains expectations on the latent ability of 
CEOs. Bhagat et al. (2010) report stock market reaction to announcements of appointments 
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of CEOs with stronger educational credentials is positive and creates significant abnormal 
returns. Falato et al. (2015) find firms pay a premium to newly appointed CEOs with 
superior educational credentials. Yet, not all forms of CEO education produce a 
homogenous effect on firm performance because of selection effects. Academic 
qualifications vary by levels and quality of awarding institutions. This leads to differences 
in CEO skill-sets and results in performance differentials (Miller et al., 2015).  
We investigate if a particular type of CEO education has greater causal effect on firm 
performance. Literature on the demand for human capital piques our interest. Frydman 
(2007) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) describe the recent growth in business education 
as reaction to increasing demand for general managerial skills over technical skills. This 
shift in preference stems from the fact that firms have become considerably larger and more 
complex because of technological advances and innovations in business practices.1 In 
support, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) report that fund managers who graduated from 
universities with tougher entry requirements, and managers with MBA awards, generated 
higher returns. Evidence shows CEOs with MBA choose more aggressive corporate 
strategies (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), and such CEOs speculate more in the forex market 
(Beber and Fabbri, 2012).  
For our analysis, we carefully construct a unique hand-collected dataset that captures 
CEO educational qualifications for 149 large US banks for the period 1992 to 2011. A 
relatively recent process of financial deregulation and financial innovation has increased 
                                               
1 Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) report a 15 percentage point increase in the number of CEO hires with MBA 
from the 1970s to the 1990s (14 to 29 percent). The statistics infer that approximately one-in-three U.S. CEOs 
held an MBA qualification in the 1990s. 
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the scale and scope of what have become increasingly complex operations. The opaque 
nature of a bank’s assets and liabilities, and the fact that large banks operate across financial 
markets and jurisdictions including cross-border, suggests that the banking industry is an 
ideal laboratory on which to test the proposition that the observed increase in business 
education and preference for general managerial skills has resulted in superior firm 
performance outcomes. We collect data on the types of degrees held by CEOs 
(undergraduate, MBA, or PhD) and identify if the awarding university is amongst the top-
20 U.S. institutions according to U.S. World and News Report, following Bhagat et al. 
(2010) and Cohen et al. (2010). Just under 40% of our sample CEOs hold MBA awards. 
We exploit the properties of the dataset to determine the sensitivity of bank 
performance to the level and quality of CEO educational attainment. To do this, we develop 
a CEO Education Index comprising three factors: UG Education (constituting a basic 
undergraduate level of training that aids development of transferable skills), MBA 
Education (representing the level of management training and knowledge acquired 
through an MBA programme), and PhD Education (showing the level of technical 
expertise obtained through an advanced degree or doctorate). We arrive at this measure by 
following prior work (Tetlock, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2012; Ellul and Yeramilli, 2013) and 
employing factor analysis to extract these factors. Using factor analysis to construct an 
index, which acts as a barometer of educational attainment, potentially mitigates issues 
arising from subjective researcher judgement. For instance, the choice of variables that 
should be included and how each factor should be scored relative to other factors (Tetlock, 
2007), as well as mitigating other measurement issues (Custódio et al., 2013).  
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Our paper provides several contributions to existing literature. First, our work extends 
and complements earlier analysis conducted on CEO education and firm performance 
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Bhagat et al., 2010; Beber and Fabbri, 2012) by investigating 
the banking industry. We find that bank CEOs with higher MBA Education factors (i.e. 
level and quality of management education) typically exhibit better firm performance, but 
UG Education and PhD Education appear not to matter. This effect is also economically 
meaningful, with one standard deviation in MBA Education resulting in improving 
performance by 11.4% relative to the mean. Our main results reconcile an apparent 
contradiction between strong theoretical priors and the mixed empirical evidence on the 
impact of education on firm performance. Our result substantiates the duration of the effect 
of MBA Education, which counters arguments in Bhagat et al. (2010) that the impact of 
education is short-lived, and supports the actions of external and internal stakeholders in 
considering CEO education a measure of innate talent (Kaplan et al.,2012; Elsaid et al., 
2015). Our results are consistent with the emerging consensus in literature that the 
education of CEOs is a factor in explaining performance differentials (Chevalier and 
Ellison 1999; Beber and Fabbri, 2012; Miller et al., 2015). Furthermore, we find that the 
‘quality’ of education matters, since our results highlight that CEOs who graduate from 
top-20 US universities are able to realise superior firm performance. 
Our original contribution speaks to the compensation literature, where prior research 
has largely focused on the relationship between equity incentives and bank performance 
(Crawford et al., 1995; Mehran, 1995; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Minnick et al., 2011). 
Our findings provide new insight into this relationship. We show that education moderates 
the responsiveness of CEOs to incentives embedded in their compensation contracts. CEOs 
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with higher Management Education scores are more likely to improve bank performance 
in response to higher risk-taking incentives (notably, Vega incentives to increase the 
volatility of stock price returns) and receiving a higher fraction of equity compensation in 
their compensation structure. Our findings preclude any form of generalisation across 
either CEO education or types of incentives. Instead, we show that specific types of 
incentives and education matter for performance. In this regard, we further extend Bandiera 
et al.’s finding (2015) that managers with high-powered incentives are more likely to be 
university-educated and hold a business education award. Taken together, we argue that 
CEO-specific attributes may play a key role in explaining cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
how CEOs respond to equity incentives embedded in their compensation contracts. 
Another contribution of our paper is to demonstrate channels through which CEOs with 
specific education credentials improve bank performance. We provide micro-level 
evidence by focusing on bank business models and implicit strategic choices to better 
identify CEO actions and decisions. Custódio and Metzger (2014) point out that very little 
is known about how CEOs improve performance and create value for shareholders, and the 
channels through which such performance gains accrue. We provide new insights on this 
issue. We show that CEOs with higher MBA Education factor scores who follow riskier 
or more innovative business models achieve significantly higher levels of bank 
profitability.  
Our evidence infers that such CEOs were more adept at navigating the twin processes 
of financial deregulation and financial innovation when selecting riskier business models, 
namely, income generating activities (in the form of fee-based income and real estate and 
mortgage lending) and managing a riskier asset portfolio (consisting of a greater fraction 
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of securitized assets and derivatives). Our results support arguments in DeYoung et al. 
(2013) that the risk-taking incentives implicit in executive compensation explain CEOs 
pre-crisis decision to shift bank business models from traditional originate-to-hold towards 
originate-to-distribute model. Our evidence is consistent with findings in the non-financial 
sector that CEOs with MBAs are better at managing risks and pursuing aggressive policies 
like higher capital expenditure (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) and using derivatives in forex 
markets (Beber and Fabbri, 2012). Our finding supports propositions in Frydman (2007) 
and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) that business-educated CEOs with general skills are fine-
tuned to manage the complexities associated with the use of innovative albeit riskier 
business models. 
To add further confidence in our findings, we conduct a battery of robustness checks. 
We account for potentially endogenous equity incentives. In this regard, we contribute by 
introducing a new instrument to the literature in the form of the pay of professional sports 
players, which we use to instrument for CEO compensation.2 Our results are robust to 
alternate measures of bank performance and the quality of CEO education. Next, we 
anticipate that CEOs may select into particular banks based on their educational 
background and hence control for endogenous CEO-firm matching. Finally, we control for 
various other CEO characteristics, such as firm-specific executive experience and equity 
ownership. Our results hold throughout.   
Our findings have broad economic and policy implications, which extend beyond the 
banking sector. In particular, our evidence on the importance of education, and especially 
                                               
2 Please see appendix B for details. 
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that CEOs with varying levels of education respond differently to compensation incentives, 
fuel ongoing debate over how best to structure CEO compensation incentives. 
Consequently, board of directors should take into account inherent differentials in CEO 
characteristics when setting their pay contracts. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief background on CEO 
education and firm performance. Section 3 introduces the dataset, explains the construction 
of CEO Education Index, and provides variable definitions. Section 4 investigates the 
impact of CEO education on bank performance. Section 5 considers the impact of CEO 
pay structure and questions whether the benefits of CEO education for bank performance 
can be partially attributed to the design of implicit incentives generated by CEO 
compensation contracts. Section 6 conducts micro-analysis into the channels through 
which CEOs are able to improve bank performance, whilst Section 7 reports robustness 
tests and Section 8 concludes.  
2. Background 
A large literature originating from psychology affirms the relationship between an 
individual’s cognitive ability, level of educational attainment and decision-making. Jensen 
(1998) argues that the cognitive ability, or ‘IQ’, of an individual determines several social 
and economic outcomes. Higher cognitive ability is positively associated with mental 
capacity, length of life, speed of reactions and lifetime income. Likewise, individual 
‘intelligence’ influences decision-making ability (Lubinski and Humphreys, 1997), with 
more intelligent individuals exhibiting greater patience and acting less on impulse 
(Mischel, 1974; Shoda et al., 1990; Funder and Block, 1989; Parker and Fischhoff, 2005).  
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Education is often considered a proxy for cognitive ability. Relating CEO ability and 
cognitive intelligence to university entrance exam score requirements, Frey and Ditterman 
(2004) argue that CEOs who graduated from schools that require higher mean entrance 
exam scores are more intelligent and display greater managerial ability. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) find that fund managers who graduated from universities with tougher entry 
requirements generated higher returns. Datta and Rajagopalan (1998) suggest that both 
educational background and firm-specific experience, amongst other factors, explain 
variations in CEOs cognitive ability.  
Despite prior literature arguing a link between the educational backgrounds of 
executives and firm performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996), the empirical evidence suggests that the effects vary according to the type and 
quality of education. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show a positive relationship between 
managers’ education and mutual fund performance. They find that managers with 
undergraduate degrees from Ivy League universities generate higher risk-adjusted returns, 
but managers with Ivy MBA achieve higher returns almost entirely due to a shift towards 
greater systematic risk. Interestingly, Bhagat et al. (2010) find education is a critical factor 
in the hiring process of CEOs, but fail to observe any systematic relationship between CEO 
education and long-term firm performance. This is in contrast to a traditional view of 
educational attainment as an observable measure of innate talent with better-educated 
CEOs realising greater impact on firm performance.  
The purpose of our paper is to speak to this debate by focusing on a homogenous 
industry, namely the U.S. banking sector, and thereby control for important differences in 
CEO talent and labour market demand across different industries (Rajagopalan and Datta, 
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1996; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2009; Frydman and Jenter, 2010; 
Falato et al., 2015). There have been dramatic changes in the competitive landscape facing 
U.S. banks following various deregulatory acts in the 1980s and 1990s (Crawford et al., 
1995 Hubbard and Palia, 1995; DeYoung et al., 2013). With deregulation expanding 
opportunities for growth at banks, another realisation of this process is the greater labour 
market demand for talented CEOs that can take advantage of such opportunities.3  
We argue that CEOs educational background in terms of the level and quality of 
education obtained plays a key role in shaping decision-making and determining bank 
performance. Our starting point in this paper is to investigate the importance of CEO 
education for bank performance outcomes. In doing so, we provide early evidence that 
CEO educational attainment matters for bank performance and, importantly, show the 
potential channels and drivers behind this relationship. 
2.1. CEO Pay Incentives and Education 
Extant literature has largely argued that compensation contracts create incentives for 
CEOs to take risks, and that risk-taking explains performance differentials (Mehran, 1995; 
Minnick et al., 2011). Use of equity incentives results in inducing convexity in the 
relationship between CEO wealth and firm performance, which could lead banks into 
                                               
3 Judge et al. (1995) find the level and quality of an executive’s education are significant predictors of 
successful career outcomes, notably, remuneration and promotion. Consistent with suggestions that 
shareholders’ willingly pay a premium to attract top talent, Graham et al. (2012) document that higher 
educational attainment in CEOs is rewarded with greater compensation, observed through higher manager 
fixed-effects for CEO compensation. Falato et al. (2015) examine CEO appointments to S&P 1500 firms 
between 1993 and 2005 and find education is a vital signal of quality, with stockmarkets rewarding firms 
that appoint higher quality CEOs measured as positive stock price reactions.  
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making riskier acquisitions (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011) and riskier investment 
choices (DeYoung et al., 2013). Cheng et al. (2015) argue that excessive CEO pay 
increases banks’ exposure to riskier activities like mortgage-backed-securities and 
increases the volatility of returns. 
Crucially, the responsiveness of executives to their equity incentives and the choice of 
risky policies may be determined by their educational background. Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) find MBA-educated executives more aggressive in strategic choices. Frank and 
Goyal (2007) find that firms led by MBA-educated CEOs are more aggressive and adjust 
their capital structure faster following deviations from optimal leverage ratios. Beber and 
Fabbri (2012) find that in forex markets, CEOs with MBAs are engage in speculation 
because management education breeds overconfidence and greater tolerance to risk, but 
younger CEOs only display this tendency to overconfidence. Nevertheless, the evidence is 
suggestive that educational attainment, particularly management education, could enable 
CEOs to manage the risk-taking incentives, which are inherent in compensation contracts, 
because management education confer general managerial skills that are necessary for 
CEOs to deliver superior performance outcomes at larger and more complex businesses 
(see Frydman, 2007; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007).  
In the same vein, we posit that there is a dynamic interaction between equity incentives 
and educational background. If CEOs with better management education invest in riskier 
bank activities to improve performance, we expect them to be more likely to respond to 
risk-inducing pay incentives embedded in compensation contracts. Put differently, we 
expect the sensitivity of educational background to bank performance to be increasing in 
the use of equity incentives. 
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3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Sample 
The analysis is based on a sample of CEOs at publicly-listed U.S. banks. Our sample 
period is from 1992 to 2011. We begin by extracting data on CEOs from Compustat 
ExecuComp database and match accounting data obtained from quarterly FRY-9C call 
reports sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. We collect market data using 
the Centre for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. This produces a sample of 
172 unique banks.  
From this initial list, we retain only those banks for which we could collect detailed 
data on CEO educational backgrounds that captures information on the types of degrees 
held (undergraduate, MBA, or Doctorate) and on the awarding institutions. We collect this 
information from annual and governance reports and conducting thorough searches of 
relevant databases, such as Bloomberg, Business Week, Forbes, local newspapers and 
historical State level records. Next, we identify the dates on which CEOs first joined their 
banks, either as CEO or in another executive position. We collect contract start dates and 
termination dates.4 Some data is from SNL Financial, which we supplement by following 
the same search procedure we use to source education data. To ensure data accuracy, we 
validate each individual CEO in our dataset across at least two independent sources and 
                                               
4 We define start dates to be the first year a CEO held an executive-level position within the firm and 
termination dates to be when they left the firm as CEO. This hand-collected data gives our rich dataset an 
important dimension. Unlike previous studies, we do not need to apply the constraint of measuring within 
sample executive tenure. Instead, we are able to control for the influence of relevant functional experience, 
which may affect CEO behaviour. Ultimately, this means we are also able to disentangle relationships 
between CEO education and experience in influencing bank performance. 
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discard observations if there is ambiguity regarding CEO education or career background. 
Subject to these constraints, our final sample consists of 1032 observations from 1992 to 
2011 belonging to 149 unique banks. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our education variables. Nearly all sample CEOs 
are educated to undergraduate level (96.9%) with far fewer CEOs gaining MBA (37.7%) 
and doctorate (7.3%) qualifications. Top 20 U.S. institutions awarded undergraduate 
degrees to roughly one-quarter of CEOs (26.2%) and MBAs to less than 10 percent of 
CEOs (9.7%)5. 
3.2. CEO Education Index 
A priori, our assumption is that the six education variables represent an underlying 
fundamental construct (or latent variable), which we interpret as CEO education index. 
Prior work confirms the suitability of using factor analysis techniques for constructing our 
education index. Tetlock (2007) employs factor analysis to constitute a composite measure 
of media pessimism and shows the pessimism factor predicts trading volumes and stock 
returns. Kaplan et al. (2012) assess which CEO characteristics affect the performance of 
firms participating in private equity transactions by analysing interview transcripts of 
                                               
5 There is cross-sectional hetereogeneity in terms of the distribution of the top-20 universities across our 
sample. For instance, 18% of CEOs had a UG degree from Harvard, 9% from Princeton and Dartmouth, and 
6% from Duke, Stanford, and Cornell. Similarly, nearly 40% of CEOs in our sample had an MBA from 
Harvard and Stanford; and nearly 66% of CEOs had a PhD from Harvard and 34% from Stanford. 
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potential CEO candidates. Their factor solution identifies CEO ability based on three 
dimensions that capture overall CEO talent, communication and interpersonal abilities, and 
execution skills. Ellul and Yeramilli (2013) construct a Risk Management Index (RMI) 
comprising six bank-specific variables, with higher values of RMI indicating better quality 
of risk oversight and stronger risk controls. The authors show that banks with higher RMI 
were less risky during the financial crisis. 
In the spirit of these studies, we use factor analysis to extract the underlying structure 
from the variance-covariance matrix of our six education categories. Factor analysis 
extracts the key factors of the CEO Education Index. It takes into account the total variance 
of each variable and groups variables that have high levels of shared or common variance 
into broader factors. These factors share a common core and likely represent an economic 
relationship for what they collectively represent.  
From an econometric perspective, we prefer factor analysis to other methods, such as 
including all education variables or constructing a weighted average measure for three 
reasons. First, factor analysis mitigates any bias arising from subjective judgement, 
wherein the researcher assesses which variables to include and arbitrarily assigns relative 
importance to each category (Tetlock, 2007).6 Second, factor analysis mitigates problems 
associated with including large numbers of highly inter-correlated variables, as well as 
                                               
6 For instance, constructing an index that assigns weightage of one for UG, two for MBA, and three for PhD 
may be vulnerable to researcher bias. It is not obvious why a bank CEO with a PhD should matter more than 
an MBA. Moreover, there is no a priori theoretical justification for expecting that all three levels of education 
are equally valuable to improving bank performance. Similarly, including only variables related to UG and 
MBA, but not PhD, may not present a holistic picture regarding the impact of the level and quality of 
education.  
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other measurement issues in multivariate analyses (Custódio et al., 2013). This is because 
the factor solution consists of composite measures for variables that share a common core 
and often these factors are orthogonal to each other. Third, including broader dimensions 
in our multivariate regression framework makes intuitive sense because factor analysis acts 
as an exploratory technique that first establishes the dimensionality of the construct, and 
then extracts the structure and composition of its dimensions for use in subsequent 
analyses. 
  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 reports the factor solution to our CEO Education Index. Three factors represent 
vectors in the six dimensional space and these factors capture 67.5% of the variance. Each 
factor represents a linear combination of variables that accounts for more variance of the 
data than any other possible combination. The factor loadings for each variable on the three 
factors indicate the correlation of each variable with the broader factor and indicate the 
contribution of each variable in defining that factor.  
The first factor, representing 25.9% of the variation, is a combination of two key 
variables: Level and Quality of PhD. Hereafter, we use the term PhD Education to refer 
to this first factor and interpret it as showing CEOs technical expertise acquired through a 
doctorate degree. The next factor represents the linear combination of variables that 
explains most of the covariance amongst remaining variables, after accounting for the 
variance explained by our first factor. This factor loads significantly on two key items: 
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Level and Quality of MBA. These characteristics capture CEOs general management 
knowledge and training acquired through an MBA degree.7 Hence, we interpret this factor 
as measuring MBA Education. Similarly, the third factor represents CEOs UG Education 
since it loads significantly on two variables: Level and Quality of Undergraduate Degree.  
We follow Tetlock (2007) and Kaplan et al. (2012) in using these factor loadings to 
predict factor scores for each of our three factors. Factor score is a standardized value that 
is computed using all of the variables, with their influence based on the factor loadings. 
Ceteris paribus, a CEO in our sample awarded an MBA by Harvard University has a MBA 
Education factor score of 2.248, reflecting that she is 2.248 standard deviations above the 
sample mean. However, a CEO who has no MBA has the corresponding factor score of -
0.806. Similarly, a CEO who has an undergraduate degree from Princeton University has 
a UG Education factor score of 0.962, while a CEO with an undergraduate degree from 
non-top 20 US institution has a factor score of 0.063.  
Taken together, factor analysis helps in first deriving the structure of our 
multidimensional CEO Education Index construct, which lays the conceptual foundation, 
and we use this factor solution to estimate the relationship between CEO education and 
bank performance in Section 4. 
3.3. Measuring Bank Performance 
Our primary measure of firm performance is a proxy for bank profitability adjusted 
for industry trends, which we define as a bank’s ROA minus the mean ROA of all other 
                                               
7 Custódio et al. (2013) note that firms tend to offer more lucrative compensation to CEOs with general 
managerial skills in comparison with more specialist CEOs.  
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banks on a per annum basis. ROA, return on assets, is the ratio of net income-to-the book 
value of assets. We industry-adjust our profitability measure to eliminate any industry-
wide component that is driven by factors unrelated to CEO talent and is beyond their 
control (Holmstrom, 1982; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Jenter and Kannan, 2015). In 
additional robustness checks (Section 7.1), we show our results using alternate 
performance measures, such as Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and the 
likelihood of a bank receiving external government support in the form of TARP funds.   
3.4. Other Variables 
CEO Pay: Previous evidence has shown that equity incentives embedded in CEO 
compensation contracts affect bank performance (Crawford et al., 1995; Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz, 2011; Minnick et al., 2011). When firms remunerate risk-averse managers in stock 
and options, it links the wealth of managers to that of shareholders, thereby causing 
managers to pursue risk-increasing but positive NPV projects that maximize firm value 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Stulz, 1985). To control for this incentive effect, 
we calculate Vega and Delta incentives. Vega incentives, defined as the dollar change in 
option holdings for 1% change in stock price volatility, work to induce convexity in the 
relationship between CEO wealth and stock price, thereby motivating CEOs to pursue risky 
projects (Guay, 1999). Delta incentives, measured as the dollar change in equity and option 
holdings for 1% change in stock price, result in a linear relationship between firm value 
and CEO equity-based wealth. Delta incentives work to align the interests of CEOs with 
shareholders and could induce greater effort. Higher delta could expose CEOs who are 
undiversified in terms of firm-specific wealth to more risk compared to diversified 
shareholders (Coles et al., 2006). Following prior literature, we scale Vega and Delta 
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incentives by cash compensation since each incentive is a function of firm size8 (Graham 
and Rogers, 2002; Edmans et al., 2009; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). Appendix A 
details the construction of equity incentives. Additionally, we control for CEO risk 
aversion using the amount of cash-based compensation as proxy since CEOs with large 
amounts of cash-based pay have greater opportunities to diversify their wealth (Guay, 
1999; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). 
Bank-specific Attributes: Prior evidence shows that larger banks, better-capitalised 
banks, and banks with better investment opportunities report greater profitability (Adams 
and Mehran, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Bennett et 
al., 2015). We control for such attributes through Bank Size (natural logarithm of total 
assets), Equity Capital (fraction of equity-to-total assets), and Charter Value (logarithm 
of market-to-book value of equity), respectively. In response to banking deregulation 
described earlier, banks are increasingly relying on non-traditional sources of income to 
improve profit margins and diversify risk (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; DeYoung 
et al., 2013). Accordingly, we specify Non-interest Income, which is measured as the 
fraction of non-interest income-to-total assets.  
Next, we control for Deposits (fraction of customer deposits-to-assets) to capture how 
variation in funding models impacts profitability because banks that fund operations with 
a larger fraction of deposits are less likely to face funding fragility (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2013). Evidence shows that banks that follow riskier policies (Adams and Mehran, 2012) 
and retain larger amounts of earnings to fund positive NPV projects, are more likely to 
                                               
8 The Pearson correlation coefficient between unscaled (scaled) Vega and Delta estimates is 0.654 (0.457). 
Each coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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perform better. Therefore, we specify Volatility (standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns) and Retained Earnings (fraction of retained earnings-to-assets).  
Lastly, we control for the impact of business cycle fluctuations and broader 
macroeconomic conditions on performance using Macroeconomic Conditions, measured 
as the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state-coincident index, which summarizes 
macroeconomic conditions in the state where the bank has its headquarters. 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for our variables. CEOs in our sample hold large 
amounts of equity incentives, with average values of scaled Vega and Delta incentives 
equal to 7.4% and 33.9% (of cash compensation), respectively. An average bank in our 
sample holds 9.6% equity capital and has high charter value with the average market-to-
book value of 1.62.9  
4. CEO Education and Bank Performance 
We begin by investigating the impact of the level and quality of CEO education on 
bank performance. Equation [1] shows our baseline specification: 
 
Bank Performancei,t+1 = β0 + β1(UG Educationt)+ β2(MBA Educationt)+ β3(PhD 
Educationt)+ β4 (Control Variablest) + Banki + Yeart+ εi,t  
        (1) 
 
                                               
9 As shown in Table 3, the average value of the log of market-to-book value of assets is 0.482, which would 
equate to 1.62 after exponentiation.   
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where our primary variables of interest are the three factors UG Education, MBA 
Education and PhD Education, Control Variables is the vector of controls discussed in 
Section 3.4, Bank and Year control for bank and year fixed effects.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 reports estimates from the baseline regression, where we introduce our CEO 
Education factors sequentially in columns (1)-(3) and present the full model in column (4). 
We note that the level and quality of MBA Education is a strong determinant of bank 
performance, with the coefficient positive and statistically significant at less than 5% level. 
Specifically, one standard deviation increase in MBA Education score results in 
increasing bank profitability by 11.4%, relative to the sample mean. This is likely if 
executives with higher MBA Education utilise the general managerial knowledge gleaned 
from quality business education to improve performance through a superior choice of firm 
policies (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Graham et al., 2013). Frydman (2007) and Murphy 
and Zabojnik (2007) suggest that MBA education imparts subject-specific training that 
further improves general managerial skills.  
By contrast, we do not find any evidence to suggest that the remaining two factors 
matter for bank performance. Regarding the impact of UG Education, we expect that 
banks might nurture executives with undergraduate degrees in an executive role over time, 
before promoting them to chief executive. We test this hypothesis in later sections (Section 
7.4) and find tentative evidence that bank CEOs with better quality of undergraduate 
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education who are nurtured over time (i.e. have significant firm-specific experience in an 
executive role before being promoted to CEO) are able to improve bank performance.  
We attribute the lack of significance on PhD Education score to the fact that such 
forms of advanced degrees may be more valuable in output-oriented industries, such as 
R&D and engineering (Barker and Muller, 2002), but not for banking. This finding is 
consistent with Berger et al. (2014) who do not find any conclusive evidence to suggest 
that executives with a doctorate matter for bank risk-taking.  
The coefficients on the remaining control variables are consistent with previous studies 
on the determinants of bank performance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Adams and 
Mehran, 2012). Banks with higher charter value are more profitable. Lower leverage and 
higher internal sources of funding are positively associated with firm performance.  
5. Impact of CEO Pay Structure and Incentives 
In this section, we explore the impact of the design of pay incentives embedded in CEO 
compensation contracts on bank performance. Our premise is that the performance-related 
effects of risk-taking incentives inherent in executive compensation could further motivate 
CEOs with better management education to induce more effort and pursue riskier policies. 
To explore if the dynamics between education and compensation incentives exert a bearing 
on performance, we augment the baseline specification with interaction terms between our 
Education factor scores and equity incentives (Vega and Delta).  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Table 5 shows key findings. Across all specifications the interaction term CEO MBA 
Education*Vega is positive and significant at less than 5% level, which implies that CEOs 
with higher MBA Education who face larger Vega incentives achieve superior bank 
performance. An increase in CEO Vega incentives from 50th percentile to 75th percentile 
yields an increase of 12% in the sensitivity of bank performance to CEOs MBA Education 
in column (1). In column (3), we control for potential concerns that CEO pay may be 
endogenously related to performance using an instrumental variables framework.10,11 The 
results are consistent with our prior analysis and show that the impact of CEO education 
and Vega incentives remains statistically significant at the 10% level. We find inconclusive 
evidence that Delta incentives matter. The interaction term CEO MBA Education*Delta 
is positive and statistically significant at less than 10% in column (2).  
5.1. Impact of CEO Pay Structure 
The structure of CEO compensation can also affect the relationship between education 
and performance. Emerging evidence suggests that boards can mitigate the effects of risk-
taking equity incentives to some extent by altering the structure of CEO compensation e.g. 
                                               
10 Endogeneity may arise because equity incentives and performance are jointly determined since boards may 
anticipate CEO behaviour in response to pay incentives and restructure compensation contracts to achieve 
desired outcomes (Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). In support of this view, DeYoung et al. (2013) argue 
that the emergence of new investment opportunities and competitive environment post-1999 (i.e. following 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act) motivated board members to structure CEO pay in a manner which gives CEOs 
strong incentives to respond and shift bank business models towards riskier policies. 
11 Following Coles et al. (2006) and Liu and Mauer (2011), we instrument endogenous CEO equity incentives 
through CEO age since older CEOs are more likely to hold greater firm-specific equity wealth. Our second 
instrument is the median salary of professional sports players from the nearest major sports team to each 
bank’s headquarters. The first-stage IV estimation results show that the coefficients on our instruments have 
the expected signs and are statistically significant. Please see Appendix B for details. 
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granting long-term equity incentives and deferred compensation (see e.g. Edmans and Liu, 
2011; Bennett et al., 2015). Our sample period, spanning nearly two decades from 1992-
2011, witnessed a structural shift in CEOs compensation structure from cash-based pay to 
equity-based pay, driven by deregulation and changes in the competitive environment 
(Crawford et al., 1995; Hubbard and Palia, 1995; DeYoung et al., 2013).  
Whether such changes in compensation structure were systematically associated with 
banks at which CEOs were more responsive to such incentives is an empirical issue that 
we address here. Specifically, we assess the interaction effects between the factors of CEO 
Education Index and the structure of compensation. Following prior literature, we take 
into account the structure of CEO incentives by including variables that capture the fraction 
of CEO pay in the form equity-based wealth (% Equity Compensation) and the fraction 
of CEO pay in the form of cash compensation (% Cash Compensation) (Hubbard and 
Palia, 1995; Mehran, 1995).  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The results, shown in Table 6, indicate that the structure of CEO’s compensation 
matters. The coefficient on the interaction term MBA Education*% Equity 
Compensation is positive and significant at less than 5% level. This indicates that CEOs 
with higher MBA Education factor scores are more inclined to improve bank performance 
if their compensation structure is geared towards a larger fraction of equity-based pay. The 
sensitivity of bank performance to management education increases by 32% for increasing 
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‘% Inside Equity’ from 50th percentile to 75th percentile. Our results are robust to 
accounting for endogenous compensation structure by using 2SLS methods. We do not 
find any evidence for cash-based compensation.  
Taken together, the main result from tables 5 and 6 is that CEOs with higher MBA 
Education scores and facing larger equity-based incentives are able to respond to such 
incentives and achieve significantly higher levels of bank profitability. One implication 
arising from our evidence is that a quality business education provides CEOs with a skill-
set to manage complexities and mitigate what prove to be adverse performance outcomes 
resulting from risk-taking at banks led by a non-MBA. 
6. How do performance improvements happen? 
Sections 4 and 5 highlighted the potential value of CEOs with MBA qualifications. 
Section 4 showed that CEOs with higher MBA Education scores improve bank 
performance, whilst Section 5 demonstrated that such CEOs are more responsive to 
implicit compensation incentives.  
Next, we explore the potential channels through which CEOs are able to improve bank 
performance. This helps in identifying which CEO actions and decisions across a spectrum 
of policies realise improvements in bank performance. We consider two potential channels: 
changes in bank business models, which affect income; and changes in asset composition, 
which affect returns generated on bank asset portfolios. In what follows, we demonstrate 
that CEOs with higher MBA Education factor scores improve bank performance by 
utilising innovative albeit possibly riskier business models. Our position is that such CEOs 
are more valuable when the degree of business complexity increases. We begin by 
assessing changes in bank business models that can drive bank profitability.  
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6.1. Changes to the Business Model 
Prior research shows that banks had begun to increasingly prioritise fee-based 
activities to improve performance and take advantage of the emergence of new investment 
opportunities in the period before the sub-prime crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; DeYoung et al., 2013). Such forms of non-interest income 
include revenues from originate-and-securitize lending, fees and commissions, and income 
from proprietary trading, activities that are inherently riskier (DeYoung and Roland, 2001). 
We examine this channel in Panel A of Table 7, where our key variable is the interaction 
term between the three Education factor scores (UG Education, MBA Education, and 
PhD Education) and Non-interest Income. As noted above, we measure Non-interest 
Income as the fraction of income from non-interest activities-to-total assets.  
Concomitantly, CEOs were recomposing asset portfolios by reducing reliance on 
traditional intermediation business and in its place growing investments in real estate and 
mortgages, as a result of the real estate boom and developments in financial innovation that 
saw banks readily adopt the originate-to-distribute model (Brunnermeier, 2009; Mian and 
Sufi, 2009; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009). We examine this effect in Panel B of Table 7, 
where our key variable is the interaction term between the three Education factor scores 
and Real Estate & Mortgage Loans. We measure RE & Mortgage Loans as the log of 
real estate loans-to-total assets.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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The coefficients on MBA Education * Non-interest Income and on MBA Education 
* RE & Mortgage Loans are positive and significant at less than 5% level. This result 
indicates that bank CEOs with better MBA Education who follow riskier policies (in terms 
of diversifying income sources and reconfiguring loan composition towards assets with 
higher returns) can boost bank performance. The results appear to be economically 
relevant: a one standard deviation increase in the Non-Interest Income (RE & Mortgage 
Loans) around its mean leads to an increase in the sensitivity of performance to MBA 
Education factor score by 64% (35%) for model (4) in Panel A (Panel B).12  
6.2. Changes in Asset Composition 
Our next set of tests examine if CEOs follow riskier and innovative strategies through 
changing the composition of bank assets to improve bank performance. Using the 
originate-to-distribute model meant that banks came to rely on riskier yet ultimately hard-
to-value activities such as derivatives and securitizations (Brunnermeier, 2009; DeYoung 
et al., 2013). The unforeseen outcome of the innovation process caused a general depletion 
in bank capital and realisation of large-scale losses in crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009). Despite 
widespread losses, the literature recognises that some banks managed to perform better 
relative to others (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). In terms of asset composition, Erel et al. 
                                               
12 In unreported tests, we explore if the change in loan portfolio results in reduced loans to retail consumers 
and businesses, and confirm this. The coefficient on the interaction term between MBA Education and 
Traditional Lending Channel (fraction of commercial, industrial, and retail loans-to-assets) is significant and 
negative at less than 10% level. Since a shift from traditional lending to real estate loans may in turn result 
in higher levels of loan concentration, we assess if the interaction term between Education factor scores and 
loan concentration (log of HHI of loans) conveys a similar story. Again, we find that the coefficient on this 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at less than 10% level. These results are available from 
the authors on request.  
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(2014) hypothesize that certain banks active in securitization were in a better position to 
understand the risk-return characteristics of highly rated trances of mortgage-backed 
securities. Loutskina (2011) argues that securitization enhances liquidity creation by 
transforming illiquid loans into marketable securities, which leads to an increase in the 
supply of credit. Ceteris paribus, we expect that CEOs with higher factor scores in MBA 
Education comprehend such risks and complexities resulting in superior performance 
outcomes. We test our proposition using two variables: Securitization (fraction of 
mortgage loans sold and securitized-to-assets) and Derivatives (fraction of highly rated 
mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities-to-assets), following Erel et al. 
(2014). 
Finally, we introduce another proxy for asset composition: RWA growth (growth in 
RWA-to-total assets over previous year). Risk-weighted assets represent the weighted sum 
of on- and off- balance sheet assets, with the most liquid assets given a weightage of zero. 
Growth in RWA signals a shift in asset portfolios towards more risky investments.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Table 8 presents results. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
MBA Education and our measures of asset composition are positive and statistically 
significant at less than 10% level. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in our 
measures of asset composition around the mean results in increasing sensitivity of bank 
performance to MBA Education by 46% in Panel A, 35% in Panel B, and by 36% in Panel 
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C of Table 6. We also find that CEOs with higher PhD Education factor scores that follow 
a riskier strategy i.e. greater use of derivatives are associated with significantly weaker 
bank profitability, although such findings do not hold for the remaining two measures of 
asset composition. 
Taken together, our evidence from tables 7 and 8 confirms that bank performance 
outcomes are stronger when the CEO has a higher MBA Education factor score and 
follows a riskier strategy. This result suggests that CEOs with MBA awards from selective 
universities are more valuable to their banks because they appear able to utilise innovative 
business models and manage more complex business activities in their efforts to realise 
performance gains. This is consistent with arguments in Beber and Fabbri (2012) that older 
MBA-educated CEOs can manage incentives to speculate, whereas younger CEOs with 
MBAs are susceptible to overconfidence, which breeds a greater tolerance to risk that 
facilitates speculative behaviour.  
7. Additional Checks 
The results thus far show that MBA Education is positively associated with bank 
performance. This section presents various robustness checks to add confidence in our 
findings. We first address the concern that our results may be specific to the choice of bank 
performance measures in Section 7.1 and to our measure of the quality of CEO education 
in Section 7.2. We then discuss the concern that talented CEOs sort into better-managed 
firms through endogenous bank-CEO matching in Section 7.3. We assess the nurturing of 
bank executives and if the ‘nurturing’ effect is stronger for CEOs with specific types of 
education in Section 7.4. Finally, we conduct various additional robustness checks in 
Section 7.5. 
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7.1. Alternate Performance Measures  
We use three alternative measures of bank performance to assess the robustness of our 
findings. Our first measure is a market-based measure, BHAR, calculated over the calendar 
year, following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). BHAR is 
measured as the buy-and-hold return on an individual bank less the buy-and-hold return on 
a value-weighted bank index consisting of all public banks over the calendar year. Our 
second measure is the unadjusted measure of bank profitability, ROA. These results are 
shown in Table 9, columns (1) and (2). 
Finally, we measure bank performance in terms of the likelihood that a bank received 
external government support i.e. TARP during 2008-09.13 Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
argue that TARP receipt is an indicator of long-term bank performance because poorly 
performing banks required government support.14 For our econometric framework, we 
utilise a quasi-natural experiment to examine banks’ pre-crisis characteristics (2001-2006) 
and bank performance, measured by the probability of receiving TARP in 2008-09. Using 
logistic regression, we predict TARP likelihood based on differences in pre-crisis bank and 
CEO characteristics (see column (3) of Table 9). 
 
                                               
13 Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) report that bank CEOs suffered large losses in the value of their equity 
portfolios during the crisis. We assess if there are systematic differences in terms of dollar losses between 
CEOs with higher and lower educational qualifications, since CEOs with better education may be able to 
identify inherent risks in certain bank policies. Whereas we do not find that equity losses incurred by CEOs 
relate to their MBA Education and PhD Education factor scores, we find tentative evidence that CEOs with 
higher UG Education factor scores incurred larger losses on their equity portfolios. 
14 Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) argue that TARP funds were extended to banks that posed systemic 
concerns and had high charter value, suggesting that the grant of TARP was a result of excessive risk-taking. 
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[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
Our findings continue to hold using each alternate measure of bank performance. In 
line with our results, banks run by CEOs with higher MBA Education factor scores were 
less likely to receive TARP.  
7.2. Alternate Education Variables 
Thus far, our results were derived from three Education factors, where we identify the 
quality of education from USNWR rankings. To ensure that our results are not specific to 
the ranking criteria of USNWR, we re-run our regressions with alternate measures of CEO 
educational attainment i.e. based on The Times top 20 rankings and an index of Ivy League 
universities.15 We re-estimate our factor models and show the results in Table 10. They are 
broadly similar to the main results; CEOs with better MBA Education factor scores are 
able to perform better.16 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
                                               
15 The eight universities in the Ivy League are: Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, 
Dartmouth College, Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, and Yale 
University. 
16 In unreported tests, we assess if our results are partially attributable to education at a specific college (e.g. 
Harvard). We re-run our regressions using dummy variables that take a value of one if the CEO completed 
any degree from Harvard. Our results continue to hold even for this robustness check, although the statistical 
significance of the coefficient on Harvard falls to less than the 10% level.  
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7.3. Endogenous Bank-CEO Match 
Another issue we address in this paper is the need to control for endogenous bank-
CEO match, wherein we anticipate that the matching of a CEO to a particular bank is not 
the result of random assignment. According to match theory, a two-sided matching process 
exists in which CEOs and firms select one another, leading to strong relationships between 
bank and CEO characteristics (Allgood and Farrell, 2005; Li and Ueda, 2006). Such forms 
of matching may involve more talented CEOs being competitively sorted into larger firms 
(Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008) or firms with better growth prospects or higher 
charter value (Pan, 2010).  
The implication is that an executive with stronger educational credentials is likely to 
command greater value in the labour market17 and be in a better position to ‘self-select’ 
into the largest and most viable banking institutions. Similarly, larger banks are more likely 
to attract and appoint better-educated CEOs since firms perceive that education signals 
unknown or latent talent. Our econometric framework to account for endogenous bank-
CEO matching adopts a two-step approach, where the first-stage accounts for the selection 
of better-educated CEOs into the largest banks.18 In the second-stage, we use the estimated 
                                               
17 In the absence of perfect information in hiring decisions, one important indicator of a prospective CEO’s 
managerial talent, or innate ability, is their University education. In support, empirical papers examining 
CEO appointments find that stock markets positively value CEO educational backgrounds (Falato et al., 
2015; Nguyen et al., 2015). Moreover, Rivera (2010) examines the hiring process at investment banks and 
other elite professional services firms by conducting interviews with industry professionals responsible for 
hiring high-level employees. The findings endorse opinion that the quality of education is a key component 
in hiring decisions. 
18 Our first-stage model specification is:  
Top10banki,t = β0+β1 UG Degreei,t+β2 MBA Degreei,t+β3 PhD Degreei,t + ε 
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probabilities that a CEO selects into a top-decile bank as probability weights19 and repeat 
our main analysis from Table 4. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
The results shown in Table 11 reaffirm our key findings. Banks that employ CEOs 
with higher MBA Education factor scores perform better. We note that the coefficient on 
PhD Education is positive in column (3) but this result dissipates when we include all 
three factors of CEO Education Index.  
7.4. ‘Nurturing’ or Executive Experience 
Prior career experience and the degree of training imparted can shape executive ability 
in order to develop them into top executives of the future (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Hambrick, 2007; Barker and Mueller, 2002). Such forms of training impart job-specific 
knowledge and skills throughout a career that influences CEO decision-making 
(Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996; Barker and Mueller, 2002). We hypothesize that the amount 
of time a CEO serves in an executive position before being promoted as a chief executive 
                                               
Top10bank is a dummy variable set to one if a bank ranks in the top 10 percentile by total assets and zero 
otherwise. UG Degree, MBA Degree, and PhD Degree represent dummy variables equal to 1 if a CEO was 
educated at a top-20 US university at the relevant level and 0 otherwise; and 𝜀 is the error term. Our results 
are robust to using the alternate measures of the quality of CEO education in Section 7.2. 
19 We use estimated coefficients from the first stage regression, which capture the likelihood of a CEO being 
selected into a large bank. We do this since our a priori expectation is that better-educated CEOs select into 
the largest banks. Our objective is to take into account the effect of this selection bias to understand the 
relationship between CEO education and bank performance and to validate our main results. 
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conditions his/her choices and therefore affects future firm performance. We contribute to 
extant knowledge by considering an atypical aspect of ‘experience’. Different to studies 
that focus on formative experiences, we base our experience indicator on CEO experiences 
as executives in their banks. It draws on the later stages in executive careers, and captures 
valuable firm-specific knowledge that shapes CEO leadership and management styles. The 
availability of executive contract data let us construct this novel indicator (see footnote 4). 
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
Table 12 shows results when we augment our regression models with interactions of 
the three Education factors and Executive Experience. The results show that CEOs with 
higher MBA Education scores and greater Executive Experience achieve significantly 
higher bank profitability at less than the 5% level. We find inconclusive evidence that the 
nurturing of CEOs with undergraduate education positively affects bank profitability (in 
column (4) and at less than 10% level).  
7.5. Additional Checks  
Finally, we perform additional checks over different sub-samples. We begin by 
excluding all observations where there was a turnover event to mitigate concerns that 
changes in bank performance are the result of the efforts of the previous CEO. Relatedly, 
our second robustness test focuses on the differential impact of education on performance 
over CEO tenure. Third, we control for CEO ownership since literature reports an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between ownership and performance, with large stock ownership 
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often leading to CEO entrenchment (Mehran, 1995; Datta et al., 2001; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008).20 The results are shown in Table 13. Throughout all of these robustness checks, we 
can confirm that our main finding holds. CEOs with higher MBA Education factor scores 
perform better.  
 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
8. Summary and Conclusion 
In this study, we disentangle the dynamic relationships between CEO education and 
the incentives for risk-taking that are implicit in the structure of executive compensation 
contracts, and determine the effects on firm performance outcomes. For this task, we utilise 
a novel hand-collected dataset that matches biographical information on the education and 
firm-specific experience of U.S. bank CEOs with data on CEO compensation and other 
bank characteristics.  
We summarise our main results as follows. CEO fixed effects in terms of the level of 
CEO education and selectivity of awarding universities hold explanatory power in 
explaining bank performance differentials. Our robust set of results show that banks led by 
CEOs with better MBA Education scores achieve a level of bank profitability that is 
statistically higher than banks headed by non-MBA CEOs. Moreover, CEOs with better 
MBA Education who follow riskier and more innovative business models secure superior 
                                               
20 Our results remain robust to the impact of including quadratic term of CEO ownership to account for non-
linear relation between ownership and performance.  
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bank performance outcomes. Such CEOs when facing larger incentives to increase stock 
price volatility, or if their compensation structure contains greater equity incentives, appear 
able to mitigate potentially adverse outcomes associated with excessive risk-taking and 
deliver significantly higher bank profitability. However, we caution that vesting conditions 
on equity awards may also result in distorting managerial incentives to pursue short-term 
interests (Bettis et al., 2010). Future research may wish to consider exploring the role of 
CEO-specific characteristics, such as education and experience, as moderators of the 
impact of performance-based and time-based vesting conditions.     
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of CEO Education variables:  This table shows descriptive statistics for 
our six education variables that represent the level and quality of CEO education for our sample. The three 
variables representing level of CEO education (UG/MBA/PhD Degree) are dummy variables that take a value 
of one if a CEO holds the corresponding degree, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the three variables that capture 
the quality of CEO education (Top-20 UG/MBA/PhD) take a value of one if a CEO obtained their degree 
from a top-20 US institution, according to latest USNWR rankings.  




Level of Education:     
UG Degree 0.969 1 1 1 
MBA Degree 0.377 0 0 1 
PhD Degree 0.077 0 0 0 
     
Quality of Education:     
Top-20 UG Degree  0.262 0 0 1 
Top-20 MBA Degree 0.097 0 0 0 






Table 2: CEO Education Index: Factor Analysis:  This table presents factor loadings on the first three 
factors based on six education characteristics for 1032 bank-year observations in our sample from 1992-
2011. Factor loadings are presented after a normalized orthogonal varimax rotation. Factor loadings with 
absolute value less than 0.4 are blank. The factors have been sorted by the percentage of variance explained. 
 Factor 1: Factor 2:  Factor 3: 
Panel A: Factor Loadings 
PhD Education MBA Education UG Education 
Level of Education:   0.907 
UG Degree    
MBA Degree  0.745  
PhD Degree 0.849   
    
Quality of Education:    
Top-20 UG Degree    0.479 
Top-20 MBA Degree  0.809  
Top-20 PhD Degree 0.868   
    
Model Statistics:    
Eigenvalue 1.626 1.426 0.997 
% Variance Explained 0.259 0.235 0.181 






Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of CEO Education variables: This table shows summary statistics for 
various CEO and bank characteristics for 1032 bank-year observations. Profitability is the industry-adjusted 
measure of bank profitability, defined as bank ROA minus the mean ROA of all other banks per annum. CEO 
Vega ($000s) represents the dollar change in dollar value of executive’s option-based and equity-based 
wealth for 1% change in volatility. CEO Delta ($000s) represents the change in dollar value of CEO’s equity-
based wealth for 1% change in stock price. CEO Vega (Delta) (scaled) is the value of CEO Vega (Delta) 
scaled by cash compensation expressed in percentage. Cash Compensation is the natural log of the sum of 
salary and bonus. Bank Size is the natural log of total assets (in $ thousands). Equity Capital is the ratio of 
total equity-to-assets. Charter Value is the log of the market-to-book value of equity. Non-interest Income is 
the fraction of non-interest income-to-total assets. Deposits is the ratio of customer deposits-to-assets. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Retained Earnings is the fraction of retained 
earnings-to-assets. Macroeconomic Conditions is the five-factor Coincident Index for each state where a bank 
is headquartered as provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Profitability 1032 0.010 0.005 -0.002 0.019 
Profitability (industry-adjusted) 1032  0.003 0.006 -0.020 0.039 
CEO Vega (scaled) 1032 0.074 0.094 0.000 0.359 
CEO Delta (scaled) 1032 0.339 0.464 0.020 1.866 
Cash Compensation 1032 6.736 0.780 0.001 10.009 
Bank Size 1032 16.508 1.389 13.755 19.393 
Equity Capital 1032 0.096 0.022 0.061 0.142 
Charter Value 1032 0.482 0.625 -2.456 2.666 
Non-interest Income 1032 0.019 0.013 0.004 0.054 
Deposits 1032 0.685 0.167 0.001 0.927 
Volatility 1032 0.413 0.207 0.167 0.831 
Retained Earnings 1032 0.049 0.026 0.001 0.098 
Macroeconomic Conditions 1032 141.535 18.106 99.743 202.048 
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Table 4: CEO Education and Bank Performance. This table shows the impact of our three-factor CEO 
Education Index on bank performance. Bank performance is the industry-adjusted ROA, i.e. the difference 
between bank ROA and average ROA of the remaining banks for each year. Table 3 defines all independent 
variables. All models include year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at bank level 
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UG Education -0.013   0.005 
 (0.060)   (0.062) 
MBA Education  0.032***  0.035** 
  (0.011)  (0.015) 
PhD Education   0.025 -0.009 
   (0.020) (0.019) 
     
CEO Vega 0.239 0.232 0.246 0.232 
 (0.182) (0.175) (0.174) (0.181) 
CEO Delta -0.036 -0.037 -0.039 -0.038 
 (0.050) (0.043) (0.043) (0.050) 
Cash Compensation 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.025 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Bank Size 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Equity Capital 2.821*** 2.875*** 2.832*** 2.877*** 
 (0.688) (0.690) (0.688) (0.692) 
Charter Value 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Non-interest Income -0.892 -0.877 -0.881 -0.878 
 (1.027) (1.030) (1.025) (1.026) 
Deposits -0.188 -0.200* -0.182 -0.202* 
 (0.117) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) 
Volatility 0.054 0.050 0.053 0.050 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Retained Earnings 1.269* 1.328* 1.232* 1.345* 
 (0.713) (0.707) (0.709) (0.713) 
Macroeconomic Conditions -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032 
R-squared 0.878 0.874 0.878 0.874 
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Table 5: CEO Education and Bank Performance: Impact of CEO Pay Incentives. This table shows the 
dynamics of CEO pay incentives and our three-factor CEO Education Index on bank performance. In models 
1 and 2, we run FE models. In models 3 and 4, we account for endogenous equity incentives and employ 
2SLS methodology using CEO Age and Median salary of MLS League Players in the state where each bank 
is headquartered as instruments. Appendix B shows more details on the first-stage regressions. Table 3 
defines all independent variables. All models include year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Standard 
errors clustered at bank level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
 (1): FE (2): FE (3): 2SLS (4): 2SLS 
UG Education 0.015 -0.022 0.237** -0.065 
 (0.069) (0.080) (0.103) (0.199) 
MBA Education 0.032** 0.013 0.053** 0.021 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) 
PhD Education -0.011 0.022 -0.069* -0.006 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.036) (0.030) 
     
UG Education * CEO Vega -0.084  -0.183  
 (0.066)  (0.190)  
MBA Education * CEO Vega 0.085**  0.258*  
 (0.041)  (0.148)  
PhD Education * CEO Vega 0.004  0.033  
 (0.003)  (0.051)  
     
UG Education * CEO Delta  0.045  0.013 
  (0.065)  (0.086) 
MBA Education * CEO Delta  0.032*  0.060 
  (0.019)  (0.038) 
PhD Education * CEO Delta  0.011  0.000 
  (0.011)  (0.012) 
     
CEO Vega 0.237 0.280 0.648 -0.439 
 (0.174) (0.169) (0.498) (0.518) 
CEO Delta -0.048 -0.066 -0.329** 0.031 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.132) (0.211) 
Cash Compensation 0.036* 0.029 -0.039 -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.048) 
Bank Size 0.005 -0.030 0.051 0.020 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.039) (0.042) 
Equity Capital 2.855*** 3.700*** 2.745*** 2.383*** 
 (0.688) (0.885) (0.625) (0.852) 
Charter Value 0.191*** 0.216*** 0.272*** 0.212*** 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.051) (0.063) 
Non-interest Income -0.896 -0.556 0.542 0.556 
 (1.019) (0.646) (0.414) (0.635) 
Deposits -0.203* -0.217* -0.213* -0.291** 
 (0.122) (0.119) (0.124) (0.127) 
Volatility 0.046 0.022 0.117** 0.044 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.050) (0.049) 
Retained Earnings 1.442* -1.201 1.871** 1.514* 
 (0.741) (0.973) (0.919) (0.865) 
Macroeconomic Conditions -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 1,032 1,032 902 902 
R-squared 0.875 0.881 - - 
 
p-value: Incremental impact of CEO Vega (Delta) 
UG Educ. + UG Educ. * CEO Vega (Delta) 0.419 0.763 0.064 0.948 
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MBA Educ. + MBA Educ. * CEO Vega (Delta) 0.023 0.084 0.006 0.068 




Table 6: CEO Education and Bank Performance: Impact of CEO Pay Structure. This table shows the 
dynamics of CEO pay structure and our three-factor CEO Education Index on bank performance. In models 
1 and 2, we run FE models. In models 3 and 4, we account for endogenous equity incentives and employ 
2SLS methodology using CEO Age and Median salary of MLS League Players in the state where each bank 
is headquartered as instruments. Appendix B contains more details on the first-stage regressions. Table 3 
defines all independent variables. All models include year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Standard 
errors clustered at bank level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
 (1): FE (2): FE (3): 2SLS (4): 2SLS 
UG Education 0.067 -0.005 0.111 -0.094 
 (0.068) (0.040) (0.218) (0.086) 
MBA Education -0.155 0.031** -0.230 0.086** 
 (0.095) (0.015) (0.161) (0.035) 
PhD Education 0.003 -0.038 0.017 0.009 
 (0.115) (0.026) (0.054) (0.055) 
 
UG Education * % Equity Compensation -0.087  -0.265  
 (0.057)  (0.225)  
MBA Education * % Equity Compensation 0.224**  0.335*  
 (0.105)  (0.188)  
PhD Education * % Equity Compensation 0.004  0.060  
 (0.147)  (0.047)  
     
UG Education * % Cash Compensation  0.176  0.233 
  (0.188)  (0.264) 
MBA Education * % Cash Compensation  0.091  -0.412 
  (0.116)  (0.263) 
PhD Education * % Cash Compensation  0.097  0.131 
  (0.168)  (0.186) 
     
% Equity Compensation -0.096 -0.131 1.606** 1.077 
 (0.133) (0.134) (0.773) (0.889) 
% Cash Compensation -0.033 -0.052 0.924 0.730 
 (0.184) (0.158) (0.672) (0.646) 
Bank Size -0.001 0.003 -0.037 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.038) (0.042) 
Equity Capital 2.832*** 2.856*** 2.587*** 2.548*** 
 (0.731) (0.685) (0.707) (0.675) 
Charter Value 0.198*** 0.200*** 0.148** 0.176** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.063) (0.070) 
Non-interest Income -0.835 -0.841 0.558 0.685 
 (1.073) (1.095) (0.344) (0.415) 
Deposits -0.214* -0.214* -0.369*** -0.329*** 
 (0.112) (0.116) (0.121) (0.121) 
Volatility 0.035 0.039 0.139** 0.110 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.062) (0.068) 
Retained Earnings 1.463* 1.497** 0.746 1.138 
 (0.747) (0.739) (0.785) (0.913) 
Macroeconomic Conditions -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Observations 1,032 1,032 902 902 
R-squared 0.879 0.873 - - 
     
p-value: Incremental impact of X1 (% Equity or % Cash Compensation) 
UG Educ. + UG Educ. * % Equity (Cash) Comp. 0.297 0.643 0.164 0.434 
MBA Educ. + MBA Educ.  * % Equity (Cash) Comp. 0.007 0.035 0.013 0.048 
PhD Educ. + PhD Educ. * % Equity (Cash) Comp. 0.983 0.336 0.231 0.551 
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Table 7: CEO Education and Channels to Improve Bank Performance: Business Models. Panel A of 
this table focuses on the role of Non-interest Income in improving bank performance, measured as the 
fraction of interest income-to-total assets. Panel B focuses on our second measure RE & Mortgage Loans 
that is the fraction of real estate and mortgage loans-to-assets. Table 3 defines all independent variables. 
‘Other Controls’ are as discussed in Section 3.4. All models include year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at bank level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A: Non-interest Income (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UG Education * Non-interest Income 0.655   0.490* 
 (0.484)   (0.249) 
MBA Education * Non-interest Income  1.543**  1.720** 
  (0.758)  (0.727) 
PhD Education * Non-interest Income   -0.104 -1.199 
   (1.120) (0.979) 
     
UG Education -0.009 0.002 0.005 -0.014 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) 
MBA Education 0.035** -0.001 0.036** 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.020) 
PhD Education -0.006 -0.058 -0.005 -0.017 
 (0.019) (0.044) (0.041) (0.040) 
Non-interest Income -0.894 0.074 -0.905 -0.141 
 (1.021) (1.024) (0.976) (0.927) 
     
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032 
R-squared 0.879 0.880 0.878 0.881 
 
p-value: Incremental impact of Non-Interest Income 
UG Educ. + UG Educ. * Non-interest Income 0.396   0.145 
MBA Educ. + MBA Educ.  * Non-interest Income  0.030  0.010 
PhD Educ. + PhD Educ. * Non-interest Income   0.892 0.196 
Panel B: Real Estate & Mortgage Loans (RE Loans) 
UG Education * RE Loans 0.004   0.017 
 (0.021)   (0.026) 
MBA Education * RE Loans  0.045*  0.046* 
  (0.026)  (0.027) 
PhD Education * RE Loans   0.037 0.030 
   (0.040) (0.040) 
     
UG Education 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.029 
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.065) (0.076) 
MBA Education 0.034** 0.093** 0.035** 0.095** 
 (0.015) (0.040) (0.015) (0.042) 
PhD Education -0.008 -0.046 0.003 -0.036 
 (0.019) (0.039) (0.023) (0.042) 
RE Loans 0.014 0.028 0.019 0.036 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) 
     
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032 
R-squared 0.872 0.879 0.872 0.879 
     
p-value: Incremental impact of  RE Loans     
UG Educ. + UG Educ. * RE Loans 0.990   0.900 
MBA Educ. + MBA Educ.  * RE Loans  0.035  0.038 
PhD Educ. + PhD Educ. * RE Loans   0.783 0.458 
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Table 8: CEO Education and Channels to Improve Bank Performance: Asset Composition. Panel A 
focuses on the role of Securitization in improving bank performance, measured as the fraction of real estate 
and mortgage securitizations-to-total assets. Panel B focuses on our second measure Derivatives, which we 
measure as the percentage of highly rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities 
held-to-total assets. Panel C focuses on the RWA Growth, measured as the year-on-year growth in Risk-
weighted Assets. Table 3 defines all independent variables. ‘Other Controls’ are as discussed in Section 3.4. 
All models include year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at bank level are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
Panel A: Securitization (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UG Education * Securitization 0.520   0.474 
 (0.361)   (0.380) 
MBA Education * Securitization  0.763***  0.773*** 
  (0.249)  (0.283) 
PhD Education * Securitization   -0.174 0.061 
   (0.138) (0.120) 
     
UG Education 0.006 0.036 0.031 0.015 
 (0.068) (0.077) (0.076) (0.067) 
MBA Education 0.065* 0.048 0.060* 0.053 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
PhD Education -0.053 -0.031 -0.044 -0.039 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) 
Securitization 0.944* 0.423 1.158** 0.314 
 (0.530) (0.346) (0.580) (0.463) 
     
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 763 763 763 763 
R-squared 0.876 0.877 0.876 0.877 
     
p-value: Incremental impact of Securitization     
UG Educ. + UG Educ. * Securitization 0.331   0.442 
MBA Educ. + MBA Educ.  * Securitization  <0.001  <0.001 
PhD Educ. + PhD Educ. * Securitization   0.262 0.524 
Panel B: Derivatives     
UG Education * Derivatives 0.241   0.199 
 (0.147)   (0.156) 
MBA Education * Derivatives  0.261**  0.240** 
  (0.116)  (0.120) 
PhD Education * Derivatives   -0.157** -0.187*** 
   (0.069) (0.067) 
     
UG Education -0.118** -0.108* -0.097* -0.127** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.053) (0.056) 
MBA Education 0.047* 0.050** 0.058** 0.047* 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
PhD Education -0.044 -0.071** -0.039 -0.048 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) 
Derivatives -0.277 -0.228 -0.198 -0.302 
 (0.218) (0.194) (0.217) (0.204) 
     
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 807 807 807 807 
R-squared 0.860 0.866 0.856 0.867 
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p-value: Incremental impact of Derivatives     
UG Educ. + UG Educ. * Derivatives 0.057   0.054 
MBA Educ. + MBA Educ.  * Derivatives  0.009  0.035 
PhD Educ. + PhD Educ. * Derivatives   0.014 0.005 
Panel C: RWA Growth 
UG Education * RWA Growth -0.044   -0.053 
 (0.093)   (0.090) 
MBA Education * RWA Growth  0.092*  0.096* 
  (0.055)  (0.057) 
PhD Education  * RWA Growth   -0.033 -0.037 
   (0.039) (0.039) 
     
UG Education 0.053 0.048 0.048 0.059 
 (0.064) (0.060) (0.063) (0.063) 
MBA Education  0.050*** 0.032 0.050*** 0.031 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) 
PhD Education -0.043 -0.037 -0.041 -0.032 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) 
RWA Growth 0.107** 0.109** 0.100** 0.110** 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) 
     
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 905 905 905 905 
R-squared 0.881 0.882 0.881 0.882 
 
p-value: Incremental impact of  RWA Growth   
UG Educ. + UG Educ. * RWA Growth 0.653   0.568 
MBA Educ. + MBA Educ.  * RWA Growth  0.002  0.003 
PhD Educ. + PhD Educ. * RWA Growth   0.348 0.424 
 49 
Table 9: Robustness Checks: Alternate Measures of Bank Performance. Column (1) of this table 
measures bank performance through Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) for each bank, where the 
performance of each bank is benchmarked against a value-weighted bank index comprising all public banks. 
Column (2) employs unadjusted bank ROA, without adjusting for industry-specific trends. Column (3) 
measures bank performance through a binary variable TARP, which takes a value of one if a bank received 
external government support in the form of TARP funds during 2008-09, and zero otherwise. All independent 
variables for this column are measured using hold-out samples over the period 2001-06. Results in column 
(1) and (2) are from Fixed-Effects models and for column (3) from logistic regressions. Table 3 defines all 
independent variables. All models include year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Standard errors clustered 







UG Education 0.022 -0.093 -0.228 
 (0.019) (0.059) (0.260) 
MBA Education 0.031*** 0.042** -0.566** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.272) 
PhD Education -0.039** -0.028 0.203 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.279) 
CEO Vega -0.099* -0.123 0.355 
 (0.053) (0.150) (2.856) 
CEO Delta 0.002 0.085* 0.715 
 (0.011) (0.048) (0.538) 
Cash Compensation -0.007 0.028 -0.771* 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.464) 
Bank Size -0.030** 0.015 0.717*** 
 (0.013) (0.035) (0.259) 
Equity Capital 0.115 3.744** 15.840 
 (0.277) (1.630) (13.657) 
Charter Value -0.009 1.079 1.677** 
 (0.013) (0.830) (0.746) 
Non-interest Income -0.095 0.030 -41.180** 
 (0.121) (0.052) (19.919) 
Deposits -0.038 -0.237 -0.872 
 (0.076) (0.168) (2.125) 
Volatility 0.030 2.900*** -1.776 
 (0.020) (0.862) (1.096) 
Retained Earnings -0.850*** 0.282*** -2.581 
 (0.290) (0.041) (10.201) 
Macroeconomic Conditions -0.000 -0.000 0.022 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) 
    
Observations 1,027 1,032 375 




Table 10: Robustness Checks: Alternate Measures of CEO Education Quality. This table constructs 
three-factor CEO Education Index using alternate measures of CEOs quality of education. In column (1), we 
measure quality of education, if the CEO received her/his undergraduate, MBA, and PhD degree from a 
university that ranks amongst the top-20 universities according to Times Higher Education rankings. In 
column (2), we measure CEOs quality of education through dummy variables that take a value of one if the 
CEO received his/her undergraduate, MBA, and PhD degree from a university classified as an Ivy League 
university, and zero otherwise. Table 3 defines all independent variables. All models include year fixed 
effects and bank fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at bank level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 




UG Education 0.060 0.057 
 (0.136) (0.111) 
MBA Education 0.073** 0.042*** 
 (0.030) (0.015) 
PhD Education -0.037 -0.001 
 (0.034) (0.017) 
CEO Vega 0.246 0.240 
 (0.182) (0.181) 
CEO Delta -0.040 -0.043 
 (0.049) (0.050) 
Cash Compensation 0.026 0.024 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Bank Size 0.004 0.003 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Equity Capital 2.887*** 2.875*** 
 (0.688) (0.689) 
Charter Value 0.191*** 0.193*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
Non-interest Income -0.859 -0.868 
 (1.018) (1.020) 
Deposits -0.194 -0.206* 
 (0.117) (0.118) 
Volatility 0.052 0.051 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
Retained Earnings 1.310* 1.351* 
 (0.705) (0.714) 
Macroeconomic Conditions -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Observations 1,032 1,032 





Table 11: Robustness Checks: Endogenous Firm-CEO Matching. This table shows the impact of our 
three-factor CEO Education Index on bank performance whilst controlling for potential CEO-bank 
endogenous selection bias (please refer to Section 7.3 and to footnote 17 for details). Bank performance 
is the industry-adjusted ROA. Table 3 defines all independent variables. All models include year fixed 
effects and bank fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at bank level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UG Education -0.010   0.038 
 (0.069)   (0. 065) 
MBA Education  0.035***  0. 041** 
  (0.012)  (0.017) 
PhD Education   0.037** -0.008 
   (0.019) (0.032) 
     
CEO Vega 0.548** 0.531** 0.550** 0.540** 
 (0.250) (0.242) (0.242) (0.249) 
CEO Delta -0.073 -0.070 -0.070 -0.076 
 (0.058) (0.053) (0.052) (0.057) 
Cash Compensation 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Bank Size 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Equity Capital 2.896*** 2.960*** 2.911*** 2.964*** 
 (0.661) (0.657) (0.667) (0.657) 
Charter Value 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Non-interest Income -0.051 -0.029 -0.029 -0.031 
 (0.716) (0.716) (0.711) (0.711) 
Deposits -0.413** -0.438** -0.408 -0.436** 
 (0.180) (0.176) (0.179) (0.180) 
Volatility 0.037 -0.044 -0.039 -0.043 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
Retained Earnings 2.553*** 2.621*** 2.493*** 2.644*** 
 (0.759) (0.720) (0.743) (0.722) 
Macroeconomic Conditions 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032 





Table 12: CEO Education and Bank Performance: Impact of Executive Experience. We measure 
executive experience as the time (in years) from the first year when a CEO held an executive position 
within the bank to the termination date when they left the bank as CEO. Table 3 defines all independent 
variables. ‘Other Controls’ are as discussed in Section 3.4. All models include year fixed effects and 
bank fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at bank level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Executive Experience * UG Education 0.000   0.004* 
 (0.001)   (0.002) 
Executive Experience * MBA Education  0.007***  0.007*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Executive Experience * PhD Education   0.005 0.002 
   (0.005) (0.006) 
     
UG Education -0.154 -0.056 -0.162 -0.119 
 (0.097) (0.105) (0.099) (0.087) 
MBA Education 0.022 0.066** 0.022 0.058** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.033) (0.023) 
PhD Education -0.003 -0.057** -0.039 -0.068 
 (0.039) (0.028) (0.052) (0.047) 
Executive Experience -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
CEO Vega -0.125 -0.065 -0.106 -0.067 
 (0.133) (0.125) (0.130) (0.127) 
CEO Delta 0.103** 0.094* 0.098** 0.089* 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Cash Compensation 0.023 0.025 0.021 0.023 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Bank Size 0.055 0.056 0.055 0.056 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) 
Equity Capital 2.467*** 2.762*** 2.422*** 2.823*** 
 (0.854) (0.812) (0.850) (0.825) 
Charter Value 0.283*** 0.276*** 0.281*** 0.278*** 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) 
Non-interest Income 4.165*** 3.951*** 4.137*** 3.879*** 
 (1.156) (0.911) (1.130) (0.874) 
Deposits -0.175 -0.136 -0.195 -0.132 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) 
Volatility 0.030 0.025 0.032 0.024 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Retained Earnings 1.369 1.246 1.361 1.292 
 (0.946) (0.921) (0.944) (0.915) 
Macroeconomic Conditions -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Observations 926 926 926 926 





Table 13: Additional Checks. This table presents the results of regressing bank performance on 
different sub-samples. In column (1), we exclude all observations where a CEO turnover event occurred 
since it is less likely that newly appointed CEOs can influence bank performance materially and to 
mitigate concerns arising from using educational characteristics of the incumbent CEO on current bank 
performance. In columns (2) and (3), we show results by splitting the sample according to whether CEOs 
tenure is below or above median, where we measure CEO tenure in years. In column (4), we control for 
the impact of CEO ownership. CEO Ownership equals the log of fraction of stocks owned by the CEO-
to-total stocks outstanding. Table 3 defines all independent variables. ‘Other Controls’ are as discussed 
in Section 3.4. All models include year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at 
bank level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. 












UG Education 0.041 0.045 -0.109 0.003 
 (0.098) (0.074) (0.179) (0.070) 
MBA Education 0.044** 0.057* 0.039** 0.037** 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.017) (0.015) 
PhD Education -0.040* -0.024 0.504 -0.001 
 (0.023) (0.036) (0.545) (0.020) 
CEO Vega 0.199 0.577** -0.063 0.228 
 (0.217) (0.264) (0.173) (0.245) 
CEO Delta -0.050 -0.073 0.032 -0.016 
 (0.047) (0.072) (0.042) (0.076) 
Cash Compensation 0.006 0.042 0.032 0.027 
 (0.014) (0.035) (0.038) (0.018) 
Bank Size 0.013 -0.062 0.093* 0.013 
 (0.035) (0.059) (0.048) (0.027) 
Equity Capital 2.988*** 1.728 1.756*** 2.381*** 
 (0.857) (1.418) (0.643) (0.638) 
Charter Value 0.201*** 0.286*** 0.174*** 0.182*** 
 (0.036) (0.058) (0.039) (0.037) 
Non-interest Income -0.927 8.383*** 2.523 2.129 
 (0.983) (1.795) (1.602) (1.383) 
Deposits -0.243* -0.381 -0.309 -0.169 
 (0.135) (0.236) (0.209) (0.115) 
Volatility 0.017 0.048 0.051 0.045 
 (0.034) (0.065) (0.057) (0.038) 
Retained Earnings 1.306 -0.356 2.497** 1.165** 
 (0.857) (1.393) (1.059) (0.587) 
CEO Ownership    -0.714 
    (0.519) 
Macroeconomic Conditions -0.000 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
Observations 838 421 579 1,030 




Appendix A: Calculation of executive pay sensitivities and inside wealth measure 
To calculate Vega and Delta option portfolio sensitivities, we follow Core and Guay (2002) and Coles 
et al. (2006) to account for changes made to executive compensation reporting standards in 2006. The 
changes require fair value recording of equity-based compensation including the calculation of executive 
stock options in bank financial statements. 
Pre 2006 Vega and Delta sensitivities  
We calculate pre-2006 Vega and Delta option portfolio sensitivities using an extended version of the 
Black-Scholes pricing formula, which allows for dividends (see Merton, 1973): 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 = 𝑒−𝑑𝑡𝑁(𝑍)             [A1] 







                        [A3] 
Where the normal distribution N(Z) represents the density function, S the bank stock price, K the option 
strike price, r the natural log of the risk-free rate, T the time to option maturity, d is equal to the expected 
dividend yield over option life taken as the natural log, and 𝜎 is the expected volatility of bank returns. 
Post 2006, we calculate the sensitivities of Delta and Vega contingent upon vested and unvested option 
tranches summated for each executive firm-year (see Coles et al, 2002; 2006 for details). 
Calculation of equity-based compensation 
This measure captures the total equity holding (stock and option portfolio) or ‘inside equity’ of an 
executive (see Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). We follow Coles et al. (2006) in dealing with differences 
in pre and post 2006 reporting standards. Pre-2006, we compute the total sum of current year stock grants, 
previously granted unvested options and vested options, whilst post-2006, we sum the total of all tranches 
of options outstanding. We derive an executive’s total share portfolio by multiplying the number of 






Appendix B: First-stage Regressions for Endogenous CEO Pay Variables 
 
Appendix B discusses the instruments used in the first-stage of our instrumental variables setup to 
account for the endogenous nature of CEO compensation incentives. Based on Coles et al. (2006) and 
Liu and Mauer (2011), our first instrument is CEO age. Next and most interestingly, we specify a novel 
instrument in the form of professional baseball players’ salaries. We collect data on the salaries of US 
professional sports players from the USA Today Salaries database21, which contains data for all major 
sports team in the US, including Major League Baseball (MLB), National Football League (NFL), 
National Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL) and Major League Soccer 
(MLS). We focus on the MLB since baseball is the national sport in the U.S., is widely followed across 
the country, and commands extensive media coverage. We use this data as a novel instrument for the pay 
of bank CEOs in our instrumental variables framework in Tables 5 and 6 
Bouwman (2013) introduces this instrument in a study investigating the effect of geography on CEO 
compensation for a sample of non-bank firms. Following arguments given in Bouwman (2013), we 
consider this instrument passes the test of validity. On one hand, it is difficult to argue that banks use the 
pay of professional sports players as benchmarks when setting the compensation of bank CEOs. Whilst 
it is unlikely that the compensation of bank CEOs has any direct relationship to the pay of professional 
sports players in the same state since game-specific supply and demand forces determine the latter, it is 
rational to consider that the pay of professional sports players in the same state could influence bank 
CEO wage demands. The rationale is that bank CEO might view pay partially as a symbol of status, and 
become envious of large salaries afforded to professional baseball players. Consequently, we anticipate 




                                               
21  The USA Today Salaries database provides salary information for sports players for the main 
professional sports leagues by team.  




Table B1: CEO Education and Bank Performance: First-stage Regressions. This table shows the 
first-stage results of the 2SLS framework where bank performance is the dependent variable in the 
second stage. The first-stage mitigates endogeneity concerns arising from CEO’s equity incentives by 
instrumenting them with CEO age, and Median MLS Salary. CEO age is the age of CEO in years. Median 
MLS Salary represents the median value of compensation earned by MLS League Players in the state 
where each bank is headquartered. All independent variables have been defined in Table 3. All models 
include year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at bank level are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
First-stage Regressions CEO Vega CEO Delta % Inside Equity % Cash Comp. 
CEO Age 0.004** 0.018** 0.000 -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) 
Median MLS Salary 0.001 -0.007 0.012** -0.004* 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.006) (0.002) 
     
UG Education -0.040 0.647*** 0.087** 0.019 
 (0.035) (0.194) (0.037) (0.021) 
MBA Education -0.003 0.041 0.015 -0.016* 
 (0.011) (0.059) (0.018) (0.009) 
PhD Education -0.004 -0.097 -0.042* 0.020** 
 (0.011) (0.086) (0.023) (0.009) 
Bank Size 0.019 0.137* 0.028 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.074) (0.022) (0.010) 
Equity Capital 0.272 2.481* 0.049 -0.468*** 
 (0.303) (1.277) (0.429) (0.167) 
Charter Value 0.023*** 0.248*** 0.063*** -0.036*** 
 (0.008) (0.059) (0.013) (0.007) 
Non-interest Income -0.164 -1.809 -0.293 0.134* 
 (0.243) (1.294) (0.221) (0.080) 
Deposits 0.001 0.180 0.096 -0.055* 
 (0.055) (0.202) (0.101) (0.032) 
Volatility -0.039** 0.083 -0.064*** 0.027** 
 (0.017) (0.070) (0.020) (0.011) 
Retained Earnings 0.533* 2.551 0.444 -0.103 
 (0.286) (1.865) (0.520) (0.216) 
Macroeconomic Conditions -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 902 902 902 902 
R-squared 0.406 0.416 0.472 0.325 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
